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a b s t r a c t 
This paper considers a horizontal logistics cooperation in which multiple companies jointly solve their 
logistics optimisation problem. To capture the individual partner interests in the logistics optimisation 
model, we allow each individual partner to set its own set of objectives. In such a situation, the question 
arises whether only these individual partner objectives should be considered during the optimisation 
of the collaborative optimisation problem (the partner eﬃciency approach ), or whether a set of coalition 
objectives should be deﬁned ﬁrst (the coalition eﬃciency approach ). This paper investigates the merits and 
drawbacks of both approaches by applying them to a collaborative variant of the well-known travelling 
salesman problem with soft time windows ( coltspstw ). Our results conﬁrm that, even in a situation in 
which each partner has multiple, possibly conﬂicting objectives, joining a horizontal logistics coalition can 
be beneﬁcial for all partners. We further conclude that the coalition eﬃciency approach is able to ﬁnd 
good quality solutions with less calculation time, but lacks robustness. The partner eﬃciency approach, 
on the other hand, is able to provide the decision maker with a better Pareto front approximation for the 
individual partner interest, at the expense of a higher complexity. 
© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 
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0. Motivation and problem statement 
Over the last decades, the transportation sector has put an
normous effort into improving the eﬃciency of its operations.
lgorithms developed in the Operations Research community for
perational transportation planning problems, most notably ve-
icle routing problems, have contributed considerably in reduc-
ng the number of kilometres driven unnecessarily. We refer to
raekers, Ramaekers, and Nieuwenhuyse (2016) for an elaborate
verview of the current state of the art. Driven by the recent trend
owards sustainable (often referred to as “green”) supply chain
anagement, the need for more eﬃcient vehicle routing has only
ntensiﬁed. 
Traditionally, transportation companies optimise their vehicle
outes individually . In part due to ever more powerful optimisa-
ion algorithms, however, the potential for individual eﬃciency
mprovements have diminished and only relatively small gains
emain obtainable. Researchers and practitioners therefore have
ncreasingly searched for optimisation opportunities outside of
he traditional realm of individual optimisation. One of the more
romising research avenues is the joint or collaborative optimisa-∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail address: c.defryn@maastrichtuniversity.nl (C. Defryn). 
o  
c  
ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.12.028 
377-2217/© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. ion of transportation companies’ operational activities ( Cruijssen,
ullaert, & Fleuren, 2007 ). When different transportation compa-
ies join a so-called horizontal logistics coalition and agree to ex-
cute each other’s transportation requests when this beneﬁts the
otal eﬃciency of the coalition, additional opportunities for optimi-
ation appear. A demonstration of the potential of horizontal col-
aboration can be grasped by considering the simple case of a com-
any that transports a full truck of goods from point A to point B,
nd then—rather than driving back empty—picks up another com-
any’s products and transports them from B to A. 
The main motivations for companies to engage in a horizon-
al logistics coalition are lower total logistics costs, improved re-
ource and capacity utilisation, higher degree of sustainability (e.g.,
educed emission of greenhouse gases and other undesirable sub-
tances), as well as an increased service level (e.g., more fre-
uent deliveries). The existing literature on horizontal collabora-
ion in logistics is focused mainly on proving its potential and
mportance ( Amer & Eltawil, 2014 ). Furthermore, several simula-
ion studies and pilot projects are set up in which companies exe-
ute each other’s delivery requests. Eﬃciency gains of up to 30%
ave been demonstrated. We refer to Defryn, 2017 for an elab-
rate list of case studies. By sharing these beneﬁts among all
ompanies involved, a win–win situation is created. We refer to
892 C. Defryn, K. Sörensen / European Journal of Operational Research 267 (2018) 891–903 
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p  Leitner, Meizer, Prochazka, and Sihn (2011) for a more elaborate
introduction to horizontal cooperation. 
As a coalition has more opportunities for optimisation than an
individual partner, collaboration in logistics is widely recognised
as one of the core challenges for the immediate future ( Pomponi,
Fratocchi, & Tafuri, 2015 ). However, those opportunities need to
be seized. Next to practical issues (such as ﬁnding the right part-
ner(s), the sharing of information, legal contracts,...), this requires
advanced planning algorithms. Compared to the stand-alone sce-
nario, operational planning in a horizontal logistics coalition is
considerably more complex. Partly, this is due to the size of the
optimisation problem, which is obviously much larger in a hori-
zontal cooperation. Also the higher amount of stakeholders that
can have different (possibly conﬂicting) objectives contributes to
the increased complexity. To the best of our knowledge, the latter
is never considered in the existing optimisation frameworks. 
The main contributions to the ﬁeld of horizontal logistics coop-
eration with a focus on the operational optimisation problem are
listed in Table 1 . Using the Web of Science, 1 59 journal publica-
tions on the topic of ‘horizontal cooperation’ (or ‘horizontal col-
laboration’) and ‘logistics’ are retrieved. Careful screening on the
title and the abstract yielded a subset of 20 papers for further
study. This set was extended by means of a manual search us-
ing the same keywords, resulting in a ﬁnal set of 22 publications.
All cited references are categorised according to the deﬁnition of
the objective function in the model formulation. Four different ob-
jective functions could be identiﬁed: minimise the total distance
travelled by all vehicles, minimise the total logistics cost (besides
a distance-based cost, these models typically include ﬁxed vehicle
costs, time-based costs, handling costs or additional penalty costs),
minimise the number of vehicles and maximise the total proﬁt for
the coalition. 
We observe that in all existing approaches the logistics optimi-
sation problem is deﬁned at the level of the coalition, with only
one global objective. In this case, the collaborative problem deﬁ-
nition is obtained by combining all transportation requests of the
individual partners into one large optimisation problem for which
one or more global objective functions, which we will refer to
as coalition objectives , are deﬁned. As a consequence, the multi-
partner context and individual partner characteristics are ignored
and it is assumed that all partners agree on the set of global ob-
jectives. By adoption such an approach, the logistics planning can
be optimised using any existing, non-collaborative optimisation
technique. Although it is reasonable that partners in a horizontal
coalition have a common goal and vision on when cooperation is
successful, it should not be ignored that each individual partner
remains an independent entity. Moreover, the coalition objectives
are virtual objectives in the sense that these objectives have been
deﬁned only to solve the collaborative routing problem. For none
of the partners, the coalition objectives themselves are important,
but a solution will only be accepted or rejected by a partner based
on the objectives of that individual partner (which we call partner
objectives ). With this paper, we are the ﬁrst to propose optimisa-
tion models for logistics planning in a horizontal logistics cooper-
ation that include individual partner objectives in the optimisation
procedure. 
To allow for the evaluation of all partner objectives, an alloca-
tion rule is to be deﬁned to redistribute the obtained results at
the coalition level to all individual partners. For example, if the
coalition objective is to minimize total time window violation, each
individual partner can easily derive the time window violation at
its own customers from the overall solution. Other types of coali-
tion objectives, most notably the total cost, time or total distance1 December, 2016. 
w  
o  
pravelled cannot be trivially distributed among the partners and re-
uire an allocation mechanism . Several (cost) allocation mechanisms
ave been proposed in the literature, some simple (e.g., allocate
he cost proportional to the amount of goods transported for each
artner), other more complicated and grounded in game theory.
s argued in Defryn, Vanovermeire, and Sörensen (2015) , Defryn,
örensen, and Cornelissens (2016) , the cost allocation mechanism
an provide an incentive for the partners to favour the coalition’s
bjectives as it can be used as a leverage to increase the ﬂexibil-
ty of the partners. Within the context of horizontal cooperation, a
artner is considered ﬂexible if he is willing to (partially) sacriﬁce
is own objectives in favour of the coalition. 
An important question arises whether this allocation rule and
he evaluation of the individual partner objectives should be exe-
uted after the best solution for the coalition has been found, or
uring the search. In Vanovermeire and Sörensen (2014a) , it has
een demonstrated that the best solution found using the coali-
ion objective is not always equal to the best solution found using
he partner objectives, i.e., when for example the cost is divided
uring the search. In other words, when the optimisation process
akes the individual partner objectives into account while looking
or a good solution, the ﬁnal result is generally better for all part-
ers, at the expense of larger computing times. Vanovermeire and
örensen (2014a) only considered the situation in which all part-
ers have the same single objective. This paper proposes an ex-
ension to the analysis in Vanovermeire and Sörensen (2014a) for
ituations in which each partner may have multiple conﬂicting
bjectives. 
When multiple partners, each of which having multiple ob-
ectives, jointly perform their operational planning, two options
rise. A ﬁrst option is that the coalition ﬁrst deﬁnes a set of
lobal coalition objectives, encompassing all objectives of all part-
ers, then ﬁnds a solution or a set of non-dominated solutions
or these global objectives, and then divides the objectives (costs)
ack to the individual partners. We call this approach the coalition
ﬃciency approach . The second option is to consider all individ-
al partner objectives and ﬁnd a set of non-dominated solutions
or each individual partner, without ﬁrst aggregating them into
oalition objectives. We call this approach the partner eﬃciency
pproach . ( Fig. 1 ). 
The main research question of this paper is to ﬁnd the bene-
ts and drawbacks of either models, and ﬁnd out which one per-
orms best. Both methods are described in more detail by apply-
ng them to the travelling salesman problem with soft time windows
 tspstw ). This problem has the advantage of being well-known,
nd has been chosen mainly for illustrative purposes. Both models,
owever, are generic and applicable to any collaborative planning
roblem. 
The following Sections of this paper are organised as follows.
n Section 2 we describe the tspstw and its collaborative vari-
nt, the coltspstw . The coalition eﬃciency and the partner eﬃ-
iency approach, are introduced in Sections 3 and 4 respectively.
fterwards, both approaches are tested on a set of collaborative
spstw instances. The results of these experiments can be found in
ection 5 . Finally, Section 6 summarises the main conclusions. 
. Case: the multi-objective travelling salesman problem with 
oft time windows 
In this section, we ﬁrst introduce the speciﬁc variant of the
spstw used in this paper. Then, the collaborative variant of this
roblem, the collaborative travelling salesman problem with soft time
indows ( coltspstw ), is introduced. The coltspstw will be used as
ur explanatory example throughout the following sections of the
aper. 
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Table 1 
Literature review. 
Reference Objective Description 
Cruijssen, Bräysy, Dullaert, Fleuren, and 
Salomon (2007) 
Min. total cost The VRPTW is studied in which the sum of distribution costs of individual companies is compared 
to the distribution cost under joint route planning by varying multiple operational characteristics. 
Krajewska, Kopfer, Laporte, Ropke, and 
Zaccour (2008) 
Min. total distance The single-depot PDPTW is compared to its collaborative variant, modelled as a multi-depot 
PDPTW. The total coalition cost is divided among the partners by using the Shapley value method 
after the optimisation procedure. 
Berger and Bierwirth (2010) Max. total proﬁt A decentralised control and auction based exchange mechanism are presented for exchanging 
transportation requests to facilitate collaboration among independent carriers without capacity 
restrictions. 
Dahl and Derigs (2011) Min. total cost A dynamic PDVRPTW with order exchange is studied for a collaborative logistics network. 
Lozano, Moreno, Adenso-Díaz, and 
Algaba (2013) 
Min. total cost A MILP is presented to match transportation requests of multiple companies. Different cost 
allocation methods are compared. 
Adenso-Díaz, Lozano, and Moreno 
(2014) 
Min. total cost The proposed model aims to match FTL transports. The summed stand-alone scenario is compared 
to a merged scenario, containing all transports of all collaborating companies. The impact of 
different partner characteristics on the synergy is studied. 
Adenso-Díaz, Lozano, Garcia-Carbajal, 
and Smith-Miles (2014) 
Min. total cost Considering both geographical and time compatibility, transportation requests are combined in 
eﬃcient vehicle routes. The stand-alone scenario is compared to the aggregated scenario and a 
simulation study with varying operational characteristics is conducted. 
Juan, Faulin, Pérez-Bernabeu, and 
Jozefowiez (2014) 
Min. total distance The savings in routing and emission costs that can be attained by backhaul-based horizontal 
cooperation are quantiﬁed. 
Vanovermeire, Sörensen, Breedam, 
Vannieuwenhuyse, Verstrepen, 2014 
Min. total nr. of 
vehicles 
The cost of shipping goods on a certain lane are determined by means of a pace list. A bin packing 
problem is solved in which the number of required vehicles is minimised. 
Wang and Kopfer (2014) Min. total cost A collaborative less-than-truckload pickup and delivery problem with time windows is considered. 
The total cost contains a ﬁxed cost per vehicle and distance-based travel costs. A bidding system is 
proposed for exchanging the requests. 
Flisberg, Frisk, Rönnqvist, and Guajardo 
(2015) 
Min. total distance The scheduling of harvest and chipping operations is studied in relation to transportation, 
delivered mix of assortments to customers and collaboration for transportation of wood in 
Sweden. An optimisation model, based on linear programming, is proposed for minimising the 
total (distance-based) transportation cost. Multiple cost allocation mechanisms are compared. 
Li, Rong, and Feng (2015) Max. total proﬁt A request exchange problem with pickup and delivery is addressed in which other carriers can bid 
on the shared requests. 
Pérez-Bernabeu, Juan, Faulin, and 
Barrios (2015) 
Min. total distance An iterated local search algorithm is proposed for solving a joint route planning problem. The 
stand-alone scenario is modelled as a vehicle routing problem, whereas a multi-depot vehicle 
routing problem arises at the level of the coalition. 
Wang and Kopfer (2015) Min. total distance A dynamic collaborative transportation planning problem for a coalition of freight forwarders 
serving full-truckload transport requests is studied. Two rolling horizon planning approaches are 
proposed. 
Wang et al. (2015) Min. total cost To minimise the total cost in a joint distribution context, the paper establishes a model to allocate 
customer clusters to one of the available distribution centres in the cooperation. The Shapley value 
is used to allocate the obtained proﬁts among the distribution centres. 
Yang, Yang, Xia, and Liang (2016) Max. total proﬁt The paper describes the joint parcel delivery by multiple cooperating logistics service providers 
(LSP). By adopting a collaborative distribution strategy in which each LSP only delivers those 
parcels that are relatively closer to its depot, the achievable proﬁt is maximised. 
Defryn et al. (2016) Min. total cost Both the decision on which customer to visit and their optimal sequence is modeled as a selective 
vehicle routing problem. Both a distance-based travel cost and a penalty for not serving some 
customers are considered. 
Guajardo, Jörnsten, and Rönnqvist 
(2016) 
Min. total distance Collaboration between one or few centrally located and several peripheral companies is studied. A 
distance-based cost is considered when allocating each demand point to an available supply point 
(depot). 
Hezarkhani, Slikker, and Woensel 
(2016) 
Min. total cost A joint route planning problem with different travel cost for driving with or without any load is 
considered. A global best solution is constructed that minimises the total cost for the coalition, 
given that certain gain sharing properties should be met. 
Kimms and Kozeletskyi (2016) Min. total distance The authors study the cooperative travelling salesman problem (TSP) with release dates. This 
problem is modelled as a traditional TSP with multiple salesmen and depots. 
Verdonck, Beullens, Caris, Ramaekers, 
and Janssens (2016) 
Min. total cost Multiple cost allocation models are compared for the cooperative carrier facility location problem. 
Freight transport is modelled in terms of product ﬂows, and the goal is to open a subset of 
distribution centres associated with the cooperating partners and decide on the total number of 
product units transported from the carriers’ central depots to each distribution centre and from 
the distribution centres to the different customer zones. 
Wang et al. (2017) Min. total cost The multiple centres vehicle routing problem is studied as an extension of the multi-depot vehicle 
routing problem. Each customer is reasonably assigned to its adjacent distribution center, and 
goods are transshipped between distribution centres. 
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o  .1. Stand-alone scenario: the TSPSTW 
Each partner operates from its own central depot, from which
oods are delivered to a set of customers in a single tour. Customer
rders are assumed to be small (e.g., parcel delivery), so the ve-
icle’s capacity will not constrain the operational planning. How-
ver, for each individual customer a time window, during which
he goods should be delivered, is predeﬁned. The underlying oper-
tional problem for every partner can therefore be modelled as a
ravelling salesman problem with soft time windows ( tspstw ). We are given a complete directed graph with a set of vertices
epresenting the depot and all customers to be served, and a set
f arcs connecting these vertices. Furthermore, a service time and
 time window are deﬁned for each vertex, including the depot.
he service time models the time the driver is expected to spend
t the customer’s location for loading, unloading, or providing ser-
ice. The time window is deﬁned by the customer’s ready time
nd due time. Arriving at the customer’s location before its ready
ime is allowed, although the vehicle has to wait until the start
f the time window before the service can start. Arriving too late,
894 C. Defryn, K. Sörensen / European Journal of Operational Research 267 (2018) 891–903 
Fig. 1. Difference between the coalition eﬃciency approach and the partner eﬃciency approach. The bold box indicates where the optimisation problem is solved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. The collaborative travelling salesman problem with soft time windows for a 
two-partner (black and grey) horizontal cooperation. 
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d  or not being able to ﬁnish the service before the due time, results
in a time window violation . The goal is to construct a Hamiltonian
cycle, a path that starts and ends at the partner’s depot in which
every customer is visited exactly once. 
The following two objectives are considered: (i) the minimisa-
tion of the total distance travelled, and (ii) the minimisation of the
time window violations over all the partner’s customers. Both ob-
jectives are conﬂicting, in that a smaller total time window viola-
tion can be achieved at the expense of a larger distance travelled
and vice versa. 
The idea of soft time window can be linked directly to the con-
cept of ﬂexibility ( Vanovermeire & Sörensen, 2014b ). If the time
windows are very strict, the degree of freedom in the planning is
limited. This will result in a longer total distance travelled in order
to make sure that all customers are visited on time. The more a
company is able and willing to extend the time windows or allow
a certain time window violation, the more freedom it creates to
reduce the total travelled distance by changing the positions of the
customers in the trip. 
In this paper, we adopt a multi-objective approach for solv-
ing the tspstw and no a-priori decision is made on the relative
importance of both objectives. Instead of constructing one single
(optimal) solution, the aim is to generate many solutions that are
Pareto-optimal with respect to both objectives. We leave it to the
decision maker to select the most preferred solution from this set,
based on other criteria. This decision is however out of the paper’s
scope. 
2.2. Collaborative scenario: the COLTSPSTW 
We consider a horizontal cooperation in which multiple com-
panies jointly optimise their logistics operations. A two-partner ex-
ample is visualised in Fig. 2 . In this ﬁgure, the partner’s depots are
denoted by the squares and the circles represent the customers.
For visualisation purposes, only the total distance minimisation ob-
jective is considered here. The logistics planning problem for each
individual partner is modelled as a tspstw . From the moment that
geographic similarity (the degree of overlapping geographic cover-
age between the cooperating partners) exists, it is likely that syn-
ergies can be exploited by allowing certain customers to be served
by another partner’s vehicle ( Raue & Wallenburg, 2013 ). The col-
laborative problem that appears at the level of the coalition is a
multi-depot multi-travelling salesman problem with time windows .
This problem is closely related to the multi-depot vehicle rout-ng problem. We refer to Montoya-Torres, Franco, Isaza, Jiménez,
nd Herazo-Padilla (2015) for an extensive literature review on this
roblem. However, no customer demands are considered and the
ehicles do not have any capacity restrictions in our problem for-
ulation. Therefore, the problem studied in this paper is denoted
s the collaborative travelling salesman problem with soft time win-
ows ( coltspstw ). 
In this paper, it is explicitly not questioned how the coalition is
ormed and how the partners deal with organisational, legal or IT-
elated issues. We assume the collaboration is set up and all part-
ers agree on a system to share information and orders, and that
 cost allocation method is selected to divide the total cost of the
oalition among the individual partners. 
The main remaining question is which objective(s) to use when
olving the coltspstw . A ﬁrst approach assumes that all partners
gree on a common goal and are able to deﬁne a set of global
oalition objectives. Based on the stand-alone scenario and the
imilarity between the individual partners, we suggest the follow-
ng two coalition objectives: (i) the minimisation of the total dis-
ance travelled, and (ii) the minimisation of the summed time win-
ow violations over all customers. As a result, we consider the
oalition to be a single entity and the fact that customers belong
o different companies has no importance any more. We say that
e optimise towards coalition eﬃciency , i.e., make the coalition as
 whole as eﬃcient as possible. This idea forms the basis for the
oalition eﬃciency approach , described in Section 3 . 
A second approach acknowledges that all partners remain in-
ependent companies that have individual objectives. We assume
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Fig. 3. Visualisation of the developed heuristic to solve the collaborative travelling salesman problem with soft time windows at the coalition level. 
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a  hat each partner aims to: (i) minimise the summed time window
iolations of its own customers , and (ii) minimise its own allocated
hare of the total logistics cost. A solution that is acceptable for
ne partner (i.e., it is in the Pareto set for this partner’s objec-
ives) may not be so for the other partners. A good solution for the
oalition should therefore be a compromise with respect to all in-
ividual partner objectives, and should be in the Pareto sets of all
artners in the coalition. In this case, we talk about optimisation
ith respect to partner eﬃciency . We will elaborate on this idea in
ection 4 . 
. Coalition eﬃciency approach 
A solution is considered coalition eﬃcient if it is in the Pareto
et of non-dominated solutions with respect to the coalition
bjectives. Based on this idea and the collaborative vehicle routing
pproach proposed by Defryn et al. (2016) , the coalition eﬃciency
pproach consists of four steps. • Step 1: Aggregate and redeﬁne the logistics problem at the
level of the coalition. 
• Step 2: Construct an eﬃcient solution set for the coalition as a
whole. 
• Step 3: Project the solutions obtained during step 2 on the in-
dividual partner objectives using predeﬁned allocation rules. 
• Step 4: Evaluate the Pareto-eﬃciency of each solution accord-
ing to each of the partner objectives. Only solutions that are
marked as eﬃcient by every partner are kept in the ﬁnal solu-
tion set of the collaborative problem. 
In the following sections, we will elaborate more on each step
f the coalition eﬃciency approach by applying it to the colt-
pstw . 
.1. Step 1: aggregation 
The goal of this ﬁrst step is to redeﬁne the logistics problem
t the level of the coalition. All transportation requests, networks
896 C. Defryn, K. Sörensen / European Journal of Operational Research 267 (2018) 891–903 
Fig. 4. The allocated cost in function of the corresponding time window violation 
for one single partner in the coalition. All solutions on the Pareto frontier of the 
coalition are visualised by the dots. The solutions that are eﬃcient for partner i are 
highlighted in black. 
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Fig. 5. Solutions for tnd available resources of the individual partners are aggregated
nto one optimisation problem. To determine the objective func-
ion of the coalition, it is assumed that all collaborating partners
gree on a single set of coalition objectives. In this way, the multi-
artner logistics problem is transformed into a traditional, non-
ollaborative one. Similar to the stand-alone scenario, the coalition
bjectives for the coltspstw are considered to be (i) the minimi-
ation of the total distance travelled by all vehicles (total coalition
ost), and (ii) the minimisation of the total time window violation
ver all customers. 
In our deﬁnition of the coltspstw , the partners are homoge-
eous, i.e., they have the same set of objectives. This is, however,
ot a requirement of the coalition eﬃciency approach. In general,
ny combination of partners can be considered, as long as a com-
on set of objectives can be negotiated. This, however, will be-
ome more diﬃcult in practice for diverging partner objectives. 
.2. Step 2: optimisation at the coalition level 
During the second phase, the aggregated model deﬁned in step
 is solved by using any available non-collaborative logistics opti-
isation technique. As two coalition objectives are identiﬁed for
he coltspstw , a multi-objective optimisation method is required.
ecause we explicitly do not want to make any assumptions on
he importance nor weight of each objective function, the method
f posteriori preference articulation is used in this paper, which willhe C1 instance. 
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Fig. 6. Solutions for the C2 instance. 
Table 2 
Construction strategies. 
Strategy Deﬁnition 
nearest neighbour Start from an unused depot and iteratively add the closest unvisited customer to the trip. An equal number of customers is added to each trip. 
sorted by ready time Add all customers from a single partner to a trip and sort them according to their ready time. 
sorted by due time Add all customers from a single partner to a trip and sort them according to their due time. 
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teturn a Pareto set ( Veldhuizen & Lamont, 20 0 0 ). In what follows,
e propose a multi-directional local search metaheuristic, based
n the idea of Tricoire (2012) . 
.2.1. Metaheuristic overview 
A visualisation of the solution procedure is given in Fig. 3 . First,
n initial solution set is constructed by the algorithm. Three dif-
erent construction strategies are used to diversify the initial solu-
ions: nearest neighbour , sorted by ready time and sorted by due time
see Table 2 ). Afterwards, each solution is improved with respect to
ach objective individually by means of local search. 
The improved solution S ′ either dominates S or both solutions
an be Pareto-eﬃcient. After having improved all initial solutions,
he dominated solutions are discarded and the search continues
ith all non-dominated ones. In this way, we also allow the size
f the Pareto frontier to increase/decrease. When the stopping
riterion is met, the current Pareto frontier is returned by the
lgorithm. .2.2. Neighbourhood structures 
To improve the current solution S , the multi-directional local
earch metaheuristic uses ﬁve different neighbourhoods. We refer
o Table 3 for a complete overview. Depending on the current ob-
ective (columns TW and Dist), different neighbourhoods are avail-
ble from which one is selected at random every iteration. A ﬁrst
mprovement search strategy is used. 
.2.3. Expansion 
At the end of every iteration, an expansion operator is called.
s the current solution set represents the best Pareto frontier ap-
roximation found so far, we expect that high quality solutions can
e found in the close neighbourhood of the solutions in this set.
y including for every solution an extra random neighbour from
ts swap2 neighbourhood (see Table 3 ), the number of solutions
n the set is doubled. In this way, more opportunities for further
mprovement are created and additional diversiﬁcation is added to
he set. 
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Table 3 
List of different neighbourhoods, embedded in our metaheuristic for the coalition eﬃciency model. 
Neighbourhood TW Dist Deﬁnition 
relocate-violation  Remove the customer with the largest time window violation from the 
solution and insert it before the customer with the largest waiting time. 
relocate-waiting  Remove the customer where the vehicle has to wait the longest time from the 
solution and insert it after the customer for which the due time is closest to 
the ready time of the customer to be inserted. 
relocate-marg-dist  Remove the customer with the highest marginal distance from the solution 
and insert it at the position where it causes a minimal insertion cost. 
swap2   Swap the position of two customers in the solution. 
two-opt  Remove two edges and replace them by two new edges to close the tour. 
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d3.3. Step 3: projection on the individual partner objectives 
As the coalition is not able to further improve without wors-
ening the value of at least one coalition objective, all solutions re-
turned by step 2 are coalition eﬃcient. This, however, does not im-
ply that all obtained solutions are also eﬃcient for each partner.
To evaluate the Pareto-eﬃciency of the solutions on the partner
objectives, the coalition objectives need to be redistributed to the
partners. 
For the time window violations this is straightforward. In order
to obtain the total time window violation assigned to a partner, the
violations over all customers of this partner are summed. However,
in order to know which part of the total coalition cost should be
allocated to the individual partners, a cost allocation method is nec-
essary. All experimental results discussed in Section 5 are obtained
by applying the Shapley value cost allocation method ( Shapley,
1953 ), as it is put forward as best practice in horizontal logistics
cooperation due to its desirable properties ( Biermasz, 2012 ). For
more details on the Shapley value method and its implementation
in the experiments, we refer to Appendix A . 
3.4. Step 4: evaluation 
When projecting the obtained results on the individual partner
objectives in step 3, we expect a negative correlation between the
allocated cost and the corresponding time window violation for
each partner. This means that for solutions in which the partners
have to tolerate a large time window violation, we expect a lower
cost to be allocated to this partner. This is explained by the fact
that less strict time windows give rise to more eﬃcient solutions
in terms of cost. On the other hand, if a partner is more rigid by
only allowing very small time window violations, we expect him
to pay a higher part of the corresponding total coalition cost. This
trend can also be seen in Fig. 4 , in which every point represents
an eﬃcient solution for the coalition. 
Fig. 4 shows clearly that not all coalition-eﬃcient solutions are
on the Pareto frontier for the individual partner objectives, which
is highlighted in black. The dominated solutions, denoted in grey,
are unlikely to be accepted by the current partner. After having re-
peated this for every partner, only the solutions that are accepted
by all partners are kept as good candidate solutions for the coali-
tion. This approach, however, does not guarantee that the set of
candidate solutions is non-empty. 
4. Partner eﬃciency approach 
The coalition eﬃciency approach, discussed above, has the fol-
lowing drawbacks. First, it requires the coalition to be able to de-
ﬁne a global set of objectives, which can be challenging if the in-
terests of the partners differ signiﬁcantly. Also, it is not guaranteed
that all solutions that are eﬃcient for all individual partners be-
long to the Pareto set of non-dominated solutions at the coalitionevel. This means that a solution might be eﬃcient for all collab-
rating partners, but not for the coalition. These solutions are not
ound by the coalition eﬃciency approach. Conversely, we showed
hat there is no guarantee that a solution that is eﬃcient with re-
pect to the coalition objectives is on the individual Pareto frontier.
n some cases, the intersection of the solutions projected onto the
areto frontiers for the individual partners might even be empty. 
To overcome these issues, we propose an alternative approach
hat integrates the individual partner objectives directly into the
ptimisation procedure: the partner eﬃciency approach . In the fol-
owing sections, the method is presented. Again, the coltspstw is
sed as our explanatory example. 
.1. Objective functions 
For every partner, both partner objectives deﬁned in
ection 2.2 are considered directly as an objective function in
he logistics optimisation model. This implies that a cost allocation
ethod should be integrated in the objective function of the solution
rocedure for the operational planning itself to determine the value
f the cost objective. 
Solutions will only be retained if they are eﬃcient for every
artner. However, it is likely that solutions with a lower total dis-
ance (cost) or time window violation are beneﬁcial for at least
ne (in best-case: most) of the partners. Therefore, these objec-
ives are also added to the model. Although only the individual
artner objectives are used to evaluate the current solutions, these
dditional objectives might guide the search towards the more in-
eresting parts of the solution space. In this way, we try to reduce
alculation time by avoiding the exploration of solutions that are
ar from optimal. 
To summarise, four different types of objective functions can
e identiﬁed in our model formulation (see also columns 2–5 in
able 4 ): the minimisation of the time window violations for part-
er i (TW i ), the minimisation of the cost allocated to partner i
Cost i ), the minimisation of the total time window violation (TW)
nd the minimisation of the total distance driven (Dist). Com-
ared to the coalition eﬃciency approach, the number of objec-
ives in the partner eﬃciency approach will be high. This high di-
ensionality is expected to increase the complexity of the model
igniﬁcantly. 
.2. Metaheuristic solution approach 
Similar to the coalition eﬃciency approach, a multi-directional
ocal search metaheuristic is used to tackle the multi-objective
oltspstw . To allow as much as possible a fair comparison of the
wo approaches, an attempt was made to maximize the similar-
ty between both metaheuristics. Although the basic structure of
he algorithm remains unaltered, a slightly different approach is
equired at some points during the search. We will highlight these
ifferences in the following sections. 
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Table 4 
List of different neighbourhoods, embedded in our metaheuristic for the partner eﬃciency model. 
Neighbourhood TW i Cost i TW Dist Deﬁnition 
relocate-violation   Remove the customer with the largest time window 
violation from the solution, and insert it before the 
customer with the largest waiting time. 
relocate-waiting   Remove the customer where the vehicle has to wait the 
longest time from the solution, and insert it after the 
customer for which the due time is closest to the ready 
time of the customer to be inserted. 
relocate-marg-dist  Remove the customer with the highest marginal distance 
from the solution, and insert it at the position where it 
causes a minimal insertion cost. 
relocate   Remove one customer from the solution, and insert it 
again in the solution at the position where it improves the 
current objective the most. 
swap2     Swap the position of two customers in the solution. 
two-opt   Remove two edges and replace them by two new edges to 
close the tour. 
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Table 5 
Construction of the benchmark instances. Every three-partner coalition is 
formed by combining three stand-alone instances from the tspstw litera- 
ture. 
Coalition id Partner A Partner B Partner C 
C1 n20w20.001.txt n20w20.002.txt n20w20.003.txt 
C2 n20w40.001.txt n20w40.002.txt n20w40.003.txt 
C3 n20w60.001.txt n20w60.002.txt n20w60.003.txt 
C4 n20w80.001.txt n20w80.002.txt n20w80.003.txt 
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v  .2.1. Neighbourhood structures 
Our metaheuristic makes use of six local search neighbourhoods
o handle the four different types of objective functions in the
odel. Some of these neighbourhoods are constructed for one spe-
iﬁc objective (e.g., the relocate-violation neighbourhood focuses
n time window violation minimisation) while others are more
eneral (e.g., swap2 and relocate ). For a complete overview, we
efer to Table 4 . 
.2.2. Solution evaluation 
To evaluate a candidate neighbour solution with respect to the
ndividual partner objectives, the projection on the individual part-
er objectives of the time window violations and the total cost
hould be calculated. This means that n two-dimensional Pareto
rontiers (such as the graph shown in Fig. 4 ) should be maintained
uring the search for an n -partner coalition. 
While running the optimisation procedure, we make use of a
eak domination rule . This rule states that every solution that is
art of the current Pareto frontier of at least one partner, is kept
n the solution set. In this way we allow the algorithm to improve
he solution further for the other partners during the following
terations. 
A strong domination rule is used in two situations: when (i) the
topping criterion is reached and if (ii) the total number of so-
utions in the pool reaches a predeﬁned threshold value. As each
teration all solutions–objective combinations are explored by the
lgorithm, the latter ensures that the calculation time per itera-
ion remains reasonable. The strong domination rule disregards all
olutions that are not in the intersection of all individual Pareto
rontiers and, consequently, only solution that are eﬃcient for all
artners in the coalition are kept. 
. Computational experiments 
Both approaches discussed in this paper, are implemented in
++ and tested on a set of benchmark instances from the tspstw
iterature. All computational results are obtained using an Intel(R)
ore(TM) i7-4790 @ 3.60 gigahertz and 16 giga bytes of RAM. 
.1. Benchmark instances 
For our experiments, we used the benchmark instances pro-
ided by Dumas, Desrosiers, Gelinas, and Solomon (1995) as the
nput for all the stand-alone scenarios. In other words, a coalition
f multiple partners is represented by a combination of multiple ex-
sting benchmark instances . In order to prevent the aggregated in-
tances from becoming too large to solve them in a reasonablemount of time, we limit the experiments to the small instances
ith 20 customer nodes. The aggregated three-partner instances
herefore contain 60 customer nodes and eight objectives from
hich two at the coalition level and two for each individual part-
er. Four different coalitions are simulated, based on the combina-
ion of instances shown in Table 5 . The instance are named as fol-
ows: n[number-of-customers]w[time-window-width].[id-number].txt . 
.2. Stopping criterion 
To allow a fair comparison between the two methods and the
esults obtained for sub-coalitions of different sizes, we will use a
redeﬁned number of iterations as the stopping criterion. In each
teration, we try to improve every solution in the current Pareto
et with respect to every objective function in the model. In other
ords, a new iteration is initiated every time the expansion op-
rator is called. The required calculation time will therefore vary
igniﬁcantly according to the model complexity and the instance
ize. In what follows, the maximal number of iterations is set to
00. 
.3. Simulation results 
All obtained results for the coalition eﬃciency approach and the
artner eﬃciency approach are visualised in Figs. 5 –8 and sum-
arised in Table 6 . In all ﬁgures, the stand-alone scenario is ob-
ained by solving the (non-collaborative) travelling salesman prob-
em with soft time windows for each individual partner separately
see also Section 2.1 ). The main conclusions are discussed in this
ection. 
First, we can conclude that engaging in a horizontal cooperation
s proﬁtable for all partners in the simulated coalitions. All solu-
ions returned by both the coalition eﬃciency approach and the
artner eﬃciency approach dominate the stand-alone solutions.
his means that a reduction in both total cost and time window
iolation is realised for all partners through horizontal cooperation.
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Fig. 7. Solutions for the C3 instance. 
Table 6 
Overview of all simulation results for 100 iterations. 
Coalition eﬃciency model Partner eﬃciency model 
Calculation time (s) Results Calculation time (s) Results 
1 partner 2 partners 3 partners #CE-sol #sol 1 partner 2 partners 3 partners #sol 
C1 1.09 6.40 25.02 92 1 2.71 185.71 1777.86 2 
C2 1.04 7.52 29.22 97 1 3.04 190.30 990.43 7 
C3 0.95 7.38 29.72 56 3 2.90 172.81 1761.75 3 
C4 0.96 7.37 25.64 95 0 3.06 202.66 2288.37 6 
Average 1.01 7.17 27.40 2.93 187.87 1704.60 
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tFurthermore, in Table 6 , the number of coalition-eﬃcient solu-
tions found in step 2 of the coalition eﬃciency approach is given
in column ‘#CE-sol’. From this set, the number of solutions on the
eﬃcient Pareto frontier of all partners is given in column ‘#sol’. It
can be concluded that a feasible solution is found for three out of
four simulated coalitions. For coalition C4, none of the coalition-
eﬃcient solutions was non-dominated with respect to all indi-
vidual partner objectives. Compared to the partner eﬃciency ap-
proach, only a limited number of solutions is returned by the
coalition eﬃciency approach. 
This might be due to the fact that the eﬃciency of the coali-
tion is the main goal in the coalition eﬃciency approach. Solutions
are therefore only constructed according to the objectives deﬁned
at the coalition level. It is only after the optimisation, in steps 3nd 4, that the obtained solutions are evaluated by the individ-
al partners and removed if not eﬃcient. It should be acknowl-
dged that ﬁnding a good intersection for all individual partners’
bjectives during the evaluation phase is a matter of luck, as these
ndividual objectives are not taken into account while construct-
ng the solution set at the coalition level. Therefore, there exists a
arge discrepancy between the direction in which the optimisation
s executed, and the way the ﬁnal solutions are evaluated. Also,
he Shapley value cost allocation mechanism, used for the compu-
ational experiments, relies on the solution set found for every pos-
ible sub-coalition of the coalition , which therefore has to be simu-
ated as well. A small change in one of these sub-coalition Pareto
rontiers might result in a different evaluation of the current solu-
ions at the coalition level. 
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Fig. 8. Solutions for the C4 instance. 
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i  The partner eﬃciency approach tends to provide a better ap-
roximation of the underlying Pareto frontiers. The reason is
wofold. First, by not limiting the search to only solutions that are
areto-eﬃcient at the coalition level, additional solutions are found
y using the partner eﬃciency approach that will never be consid-
red by the coalition eﬃciency approach. Second, the optimisation
roblem is solved directly at the individual partner level, with-
ut introducing the aggregation step towards the coalition level.
s a result, the evaluation of potential solutions is in line with
he optimisation procedure itself. The partner eﬃciency approach
s therefore able to provide the decision maker with a more com-
lete view on the trade-off between the different individual part-
ers’ objectives. This strength is also its biggest drawback as due
o the growing number of objectives, the computational complex-
ty of the model increases signiﬁcantly, resulting in larger calcu-
ation times. The average calculation time for all sub-coalitions of
ifferent sizes is also shown in Table 6 . 
. Concluding remarks and further research 
The recent trend of horizontal cooperation in logistics re-
eives increasing attention as it can yield some major advantages.
ecause of a more eﬃcient operational planning, transportation
ompanies are able to reduce the total logistics cost, while main-
aining high service levels. From an operational perspective, how-
ver, horizontal cooperation requires existing models to be revisedn order to comply with a multi-partner collaborative environment.
his paper can be considered as a ﬁrst, exploratory step towards
ore integrated methods for operational optimisation in a multi-
artner context. 
In this paper, we introduced the concepts of coalition eﬃciency
nd partner eﬃciency to acknowledge a difference in priorities and
oals between all collaborating partners, and between the group
nd the individual players. We have used these deﬁnitions to con-
truct two new solution approaches for solving a multi-objective
ollaborative transportation problem: the coalition eﬃciency ap-
roach and the partner eﬃciency approach . Both approaches aim at
roviding the decision makers with a solution set by focusing not
nly on the performance of the group but also on the individual
bjectives of each partner. 
To ensure that the total coalition cost is divided properly among
ll collaborating partners, both models aim at integrating a cost al-
ocation mechanism into the optimisation procedure. In the coali-
ion eﬃciency approach, this is done sequentially after an aggre-
ated logistics plan is constructed for the coalition as a whole. The
artner eﬃciency approach on the other hand, combines the oper-
tional planning and the cost allocation method into one optimi-
ation problem. Although this integration might guide the search
nto a more desirable direction during the optimisation phase, it
ill increase the complexity of the model exponentially. 
The coalition eﬃciency approach is able to generate good qual-
ty solutions in relatively short calculation times. However, due to
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Table A.7. 
Binary-to-integer conversion of all sub-coalitions for a 
three-partner coalition. 
Integer Binary Integer Binary 
1 0 0 1 5 1 0 1 
2 0 1 0 6 1 1 0 
3 0 1 1 7 1 1 1 
4 1 0 0 
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D  
 the fact that the optimisation is executed at coalition level where
afterwards solutions are evaluated on the partner level objectives,
only a very limited number of solutions is returned by the algo-
rithm. The fact that an eﬃcient solution at the coalition level is
also eﬃcient at individual partner level can be considered a mat-
ter of “luck”. The partner eﬃciency approach, on the other hand,
provides the decision maker with a more complete Pareto frontier
approximation, allowing a better understanding of the underlying
trade-offs between the different objectives of the individual part-
ners. Because of this reason, we prefer the partner eﬃciency ap-
proach as all individual partner objectives are included explicitly
in the optimisation procedure. This is, however, at the expense of
very high calculation times, compared to the coalition eﬃciency
approach. 
As both models possess advantageous properties, a promising
opportunity for further study would be the integration of both
ideas. The aim of that integrated model should be ﬁnding a balance
between the objectives at coalition and partner level. The compu-
tational experiments conducted in this paper were limited to small
instances, mainly used to show the working of the developed so-
lution models. To study the impact of varying partner characteris-
tics on the solutions obtained by both approaches in more detail,
a large-scale simulation experiment should be conducted. This is,
however, left for future research. Furthermore, we aim to integrate
different cost allocation methods into the suggested models and
study the impact of these methods on the obtained solution set.
Finally, the integration of more qualitative techniques for the eval-
uation and comparison of multi-objective solution spaces (e.g., the
hypervolume, measures of spacing and spread,...) might improve
the overall quality of the obtained Pareto frontiers by guiding the
search even more in a desirable direction. 
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Appendix A. Algorithmic implementation of the Shapley value 
A1. Deﬁnition 
In both models described in this paper, a cost allocation method
is assumed to be selected by the collaborating partners to properly
divide the total coalition cost. In our computational experiments,
we chose for the Shapley value cost allocation method ( Shapley,
1953 ). 
The result of this game theoretical approach is determined by
playing a cooperative game ( N , C ), where N represents the coali-
tion with n collaborating players (partners), and C the characteris-
tic function ( Zolezzi & Rudnick, 2002 ). This characteristic function
is deﬁned by the cost of all possible sub-coalitions S , with S ⊆N . The
cost allocated to partner i , denoted by ψ i , is deﬁned according to
the following formula. 
ψ i = 
∑ 
S⊆N\ i 
| S| ! ( | N| − | S| − 1 ) ! 
| N| ! ( c(S ∪ i ) − c(S) ) 
A2. Algorithmic implementation 
The characteristic function requires the total coalition cost for
every sub-coalition S ⊆N to be known. However, the solution set for
a sub-coalition is represented by a Pareto frontier in which each
solution has a different total cost. Therefore, obtaining the cost for sub-coalition is not straightforward. To allow a fair comparison
f the cost of two solutions from different sub-coalitions, we in-
roduce the idea of constant ﬂexibility . This idea assumes that the
ttitude of a partner towards ﬂexible behaviour is independent of
he coalition conﬁguration. 
Consider the following example for a two-partner coalition. The
ollaborative solution for which we want to allocate the total cost
nduces a time window violation of 200 and 500 for partner 1 and
artner 2 respectively. To calculate the Shapley value, the stand-
lone cost of each partner should be known. As the stand-alone
cenario of each individual partner is represented by a Pareto fron-
ier, the cost from the stand-alone solution that corresponds to a
ime window violation of 200 is taken for partner 1. A similar ap-
roach is used to determine the stand-alone cost of partner 2. In
his way, it is assured that the difference in cost for the two solu-
ions are based solely on the difference in coalition conﬁguration
s the values on the time window violation objective are equal. 
To include the Shapley value in the partner eﬃciency approach,
n integer–to–binary conversion is used. Each sub-coalition is la-
elled by an integer ranging from 1 up to 2 n − 1 , for an n-partner
ooperation. The composition of a sub-coalition (stating if a part-
er is a member of this sub-coalition or not) is obtained by the
orresponding binary representation. For a three-partner coalition,
he different sub-coalitions are simulated in the order shown in
able A.7 . In this way it is ensured that all (sub)coalitions can rely
n the results of their sub-coalitions. 
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